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Abstract 
This paper discusses the problems facing the Mexican economy.  It operates under a heavy 
burden of monopoly and regulation.  We focus on two issues that should receive more attention 
in discussions of Mexican policy.  (1) The family is under stress in Mexico and this retards the 
growth of skills of workforce.  (2) The informal sector is large, mostly due to the heavy burden 
of monopoly and regulation.  We find little evidence that the introduction of social protection 
programs for workers outside the formal sector have promoted the growth of the informal sector. 
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I. Introduction 
The Mexican economy is sluggish.  Some of the reasons for its poor performance are well-
known: oil revenues are down, many public institutions are weak and the level of infrastructure 
is low.  In addition, Mexico operates under a heavy burden of regulation and monopoly that 
discourages investment, innovation and growth.2  These factors inhibit investment in industry, 
infrastructure and people, and retard economic prosperity and growth.  This paper reviews these 
well-known causes of Mexican economic stagnation, but focuses its attention on two additional 
factors that should receive more attention. 
 The Mexican family is under stress.  The proportion of children living in single parent 
families is increasing.  For a number of reasons, these families invest less in their children.  This 
trend slows down the growth of skills in Mexico.  Family policy is one aspect of a successful 
growth policy. 
 We also examine the origins and consequences of Mexico’s large informal labor market.  
Informality is associated with lower productivity, diminished investment and a weak fiscal base 
to support public investment.  At issue is why the informal sector is large and what should be 
done about it.   
Some analysts attribute the growth of components of the informal sector to an expansion 
of social benefits to persons excluded from the formal sector.  In our view, this factor is 
relatively minor.  Informality is a response to a flawed regulatory system.  The major reason for 
the size of the informal sector is taxation, regulation, and rigidity.  To reduce informality, 
Mexico has to reform the tax and regulatory system that stifles its economy. 
Two powerful forces operate in economies around the world.  First, the technology of 
production has changed and continues to change.  It increasingly requires skilled labor.  An 
economy with a skilled workforce can more easily adapt to the pace of technological change.  
Second, the world economy has opened up and Mexico is an active participant in it.  For Mexico 
to compete against lower wage countries like China and Vietnam, it has to boost the productivity 
of its workplaces through investments in people and improvements in its tax and regulatory 
environment. 
                                                 
2 A recent paper by Chiquar and Ramos-Francia [2009], completed after this work was presented, complements the 
analysis of this paper by also dealing with aspects of monopoly and rigidity in the Mexican economy.  The OECD 
reports on Mexico also make these points. 
5 
 
 
Successful modern economies are characterized by diversity, heterogeneity, and the 
pursuit of comparative advantage.  They allow individuals and firms to pursue favorable trading 
possibilities.  Institutions that were once functional in organizing society are no longer 
appropriate in a world of diversity and heterogeneity. Institutions that induce efficient responses 
to unique situations and unique people produce the greatest value in the new economy.  
Rigidities of markets and excessive regulation produce static and dynamic inefficiencies 
that inhibit growth. When local legal frameworks obligate mandated uniformity, distinctive 
opportunities produced by the modern economy are suppressed. Legal frameworks that impose 
regulation and rigidity destroy the incentive of participants in unique employment and 
production decisions to foster and use their knowledge. 
Built into its political culture, Mexico has a fear and even loathing of incentives and 
markets. It has created a legal and cultural edifice that restricts its ability to adapt to the new 
economy. The anti-market bias in the Mexican labor market and the economic culture of the 
country is embodied in two laws that date to the 1917 constitution. As an example, article 123 of 
the Mexican Constitution says: 
“Every person has the right to a dignifying and socially useful job; for that 
purpose, the creation of jobs and the social organization of labor will be 
promoted, in agreement with the Law."3 
Article 3 of the Federal Labor Law, which regulates issues regarding hiring, firing, unions, 
etcetera, states:  
“The labor is a right and social duty. It is not an item subject to trade, it demands 
respect to the liberties and dignity of whomever offers it, and it must be carried 
out in conditions that ensure the life, health and a decent economic level for the 
worker and their family."4 
The ethos of these and other laws permeate Mexican economic life.  As a result, Mexico 
operates under a heavy burden of rigid local laws and social institutions.  Key economic sectors 
are either monopolies or virtual monopolies. Innovators are effectively prevented from entering 
and improving many sectors.  For example, there is a significant concentration of market power 
in important product markets such as energy (oil and electricity), telecommunications, media and 
                                                 
3 The emphasis is ours. 
4 Here "labor" means "productive" work. 
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cement, among others.5 Similarly, many segments of the labor market are noncompetitive.  
Unionized school teachers prevent progress and efficient use of resources in education, and help 
retard the growth of workforce productivity.  
Mexico has to improve its economic and social institutions in order to compete in the 
world economy.  It has to accelerate the development of its skill base.  The inefficiency of its 
schooling sector, the small fiscal base and the stress on modern Mexican families contribute to 
the low level and slow growth in the rate of Mexican productivity. 
This paper makes these points in the following way. Section II reviews the evidence on 
the sluggish performance of the Mexican economy. Section III reviews the evidence on the high 
level of regulation of the Mexican economy. Section IV discusses the high level of 
monopolization in the Mexican economy.  Section V discusses the problem of stagnant labor 
force productivity and the poor performance of Mexican schools.  These are serious problems 
because human capital accumulation is a major source of economic growth.  The growth of 
single parent Mexican families likely contributes to this problem, and policy should address it.  
Inequality in Mexico will increase in the next generation if Mexico does not address the growing 
problem of childhood poverty.  Section VI discusses the role of the informal sector in reducing 
productivity and retarding economic growth. We examine the claims that social protection 
programs have promoted the growth of the informal sector and that informality reduces 
productivity and inhibits economic growth.  We find that recently introduced social programs 
have played at best a minor role in promoting the growth of the informal sector.  Sector VII 
summarizes the paper. 
II. Performance of the Mexican Economy 
Mexico has displayed poor economic performance since its independence. As evident in Figure 
1, Mexico’s GDP per capita (in 1990 dollars) in the early 19th century was similar to that of 
developed countries such as Japan, Great Britain or Germany, and the disparity in economic 
performance between the U.S. and Mexico was significantly lower than it is today.  
 
                                                 
5 See Comisión Federal de Competencia [2004], World Bank [2006], Levy and Walton [2009] for comprehensive 
analyses of these and other sectors. 
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Figure 1. GDP per capita: 1990 USD PPP's 
 
 
Focusing only on the post-war period, the performance of the Mexican economy has been 
weak and worse than that of many other countries. For example, the GDP per capita in 1950 was 
higher than that of Korea, Chile and China. Today, the level is higher for Korea and Chile. China 
will soon overtake Mexico.  (See Figure 2.) 
Figure 2. Real GDP Per Capita in US Dollars 
 
 
 
The emergence of China as a key player in international markets has eroded Mexico’s 
competitive position.  NAFTA put Mexico in a good position to produce goods for its partners.  
It increased its importance as provider of labor and oil.  However, this beneficial effect has 
disappeared. Since the recession of 2000, Mexico has not returned to its previous trend line in the 
production of goods for the zone. Chinese producers have displaced Mexico as the second largest 
exporter of goods to the NAFTA market.  
According to the OECD[2009], unit labor costs have increased since 1997 due to higher 
wages and the slow growth of workforce productivity. See Figure 3.  Mexico has not improved 
the efficiency of its labor force and has lost its competitive edge over the last decade. According 
to the OECD, the reduced competitiveness of Mexico has produced a loss of 270,000 jobs in 
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manufacturing. Mexico's trade deficit with China increased and is driven by the low cost of 
imports.  The contribution of labor productivity growth on per capita GDP is negative for 
Mexico (OECD[2009]).  Figure 4a shows that factor productivity steadily increased into the 
early 1970s, stalled and has declined since the early 1980s.  GDP per hour worked (Figure 4b) 
has also stagnated since that time. 
Figure 3. Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing, Index OECD 
 
Source: OECD[2009] 
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Figure 4. 
a. Total Factor Productivity in Mexico: 1950-2006 
 
Source: García-Verdú [2007]. 
 
b. GDP Per Hour of Work (1990 USD) 
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Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database,  
http://www.conference-board.org/economics/database.cfm 
III. The Mexican Economy is Highly Regulated  
Rigidity and weak incentives inhibit Mexican economic performance. Whatever reforms have 
been implemented are too small in scale to keep the Mexican economy competitive.  Labor 
markets are very rigid in comparison with other OECD and middle income economies. For 
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example, the Mexican laws make it very expensive to hire or fire workers, which directly 
increases the cost of labor.  
Payroll taxes and mandated contributions of firms to the social security sector are high.  
There are additional high costs of hiring and dismissing workers.  Legal procedures to settle 
disputes between employers and employees are costly and not predictable. Legal disputes are 
solved at the discretion of councils, which operate erratically and unevenly. The effect of these 
regulations as a whole makes Mexico the country with the highest labor rigidity among similar 
less developed countries. Figure 5 shows an international Comparison of the Index of Labor 
Market Rigidity (0=low, 1=high). 
Figure 5. International Comparison: Index of Labor Market Rigidity 
(0=low, 1=high)  
 
Source: De Buen Lozano and De Buen Unna [2001]. 
 
In addition, the cost of enforcing contracts and laws increases the cost of doing business 
in Mexico. Contracts are difficult to enforce. In comparison with similar countries, it takes more 
time and money to force a person or firm to comply with a signed contract. According to the 
OECD, “it takes 421 days and costs 20 percent of the contract value to enforce a contract in 
Mexico whereas it takes only 75 days and 5 percent of the contract value in Korea”.6  
The slow implementation of legal reforms limits the ability of agents to contract, and the 
lack of contract enforcement by state and local authorities makes it very difficult to attract 
investors. Figure 6 compares the cost of enforcing contracts in Mexico in comparison with other 
                                                 
6 OECD[2009]. 
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countries. This cost is 30 percent of total debt values on average, while in countries like 
Argentina or Brazil it is around 17 percent.  
 
Figure 6. Cost of enforcing contracts, 2007 (as percent of total debt values) 
 
Source: OECD[2009] 
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IV. Lack of Competition and Weak Infrastructure 
Its geographic location and trade and investment partnerships should make Mexico a good place 
to invest. However, the rigidity of its labor market and the pervasive anti-competitive elements in 
the Mexican economy reduce its attractiveness. They are an aspect of a political and economic 
culture that has accommodated itself to special interest groups. This culture has been called 
“Crony Capitalism.”  Special interest groups get favors which lead to monopoly and inefficiency. 
The lack of a vital infrastructure in communications and provision of energy reinforces 
the lack of competition in the country.  Excessive monopoly and restrictions in these markets and 
excessive participation of government in the provision of these goods reduces competition.  
The literature on energy, transportation, financial services and some goods (i.e. cement) 
shows high segmentation of these markets and limited competition. This increases production 
costs and reduces competitiveness of the whole economy.  We illustrate the problems created by 
the lack of competition by examining the telecommunications market, which by many measures 
is highly monopolized.  See Figure 7.  The virtual monopoly of Telmex leads to high costs of 
telephone calls as well as low rates of broadband use, internet usage and investment.  See Table 
1 and Figure 8. 
 
Figure 7. Market Share in Select Segments of the Mexican Market, 2005 
 
Source: Baez [2006]. 
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Table 1. Telephone Rates, Selected Countries 
 
Note: In 2005 USD 
Source: Levy and Walton [2009] 
 
 
Figure 8. Internet and Broadband Penetration as Percentage of Total Accounts, Selected 
Markets, 2005 
 
Source: Baez [2006]. 
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V. Understanding the Stagnation of Work Force Productivity 
Mexico has substantially improved the level of education of its workforce (see Figure 9).  Yet, as 
shown in Figures 4a-4b, labor force productivity has not increased.  This is due to the 
inefficiency in the labor market and the poor quality of schooling.  Mexico invests a considerable 
fraction of its resources in education—six percent of its GDP—which is adequate according to 
OECD standards. However, these resources are not efficiently utilized.  In absolute levels, 
investment per student is low (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 9. Schooling Attainment in Mexico: 1950-2005 
(Percentage of the population 25 years of age and older with given schooling level 
completed) 
 
Source: Garcia-Verdu (2007) 
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Figure 10. Annual expenditure on educational institutions per student for all services 
Primary Education 2006) 
 
 
Source: OECD[2009] 
 
Figure 11. Distribution of current expenditure on educational institutions for primary, 
secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education (2006) 
 
 
Source: OECD[2009] 
 
 Current institutional arrangements retard the growth of skills and help to explain the low 
level of labor productivity in Mexico. Nearly 90 percent of expenditure on all levels of education 
is spent on salaries, which leaves little room for investment in infrastructure (see Figure 11). This 
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produces sub-optimal high labor intensity in the education sector, and prevents educational 
innovations. The need for infrastructure is more evident in higher education, where schools are 
concentrated in a few locations.  The enrollment rate of 50 percent for 15-19 year-olds is among 
the lowest in OECD countries (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12. Enrollment rates of 15-19 year-olds (1995, 2000 and 2007) 
Full-time and part-time students in public and private institutions 
 
 
Source: OECD[2009] 
Performance of Mexican students on achievement tests is poor.  They have consistently 
been in the lower end of the distribution of OECD evaluations, even when Latin America 
countries and transition economies are included in samples. When compared with countries with 
similar spending, Mexico does not fare well. Russia and Chile spend about the same per student, 
and achieve higher scores in the PISA examination.  (See Figure 13.)7 
                                                 
7 A similar level of inefficiency occurs in health care, where more than 10 percent of the total expenditure on health 
is spent on administrative costs, highest among OECD economies. 
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Figure 13. PISA score and education spending per student (2007) 
 
 
Why is Mexican expenditure on education so inefficient? One major factor is unionism 
(Mayer-Serra [2009]). Teacher unions absorb a substantial amount of resources in benefits for 
their members and strongly oppose compensation based on performance.  Unions control the 
hiring of most teachers in the country, and have ample leeway to assign teachers to union 
activities, diverting resources from education. Unionism retards excellence and protects 
mediocre teachers.  Union efforts undermine attempts to improve accountability through 
implementation of nationwide exams.   
There are additional reasons for the poor performance of Mexican schools and we turn to 
them next.  Since Coleman [1966], it has been known that families are major contributors to the 
success of children in schools.  Mexican families are increasingly under stress. 
A. Lack of Attention to Early Childhood Education 
An inefficiency that receives less attention, and likely has large effects on Mexican skill 
formation, is the lack of investment in the early years of children, particularly for those from 
disadvantaged environments.  Figure 14 shows a consistently small amount of investment in the 
preschool years over time.8  Because of inequality across and within regions, schooling 
expenditure on disadvantaged children is low.  
                                                 
8 The chart shows a reallocation of resources away from tertiary education toward primary education, which helps to 
explain the increase in educational attainment in the general population in Mexico. 
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Figure 14. Public expenditure on education per student relative to primary education 
(Primary =100)  
 
 A large body of research in economics, neuroscience, and developmental psychology has 
produced a better understanding of the technology of human skill formation. (See Cunha and 
Heckman [2007] and Heckman [2006; 2008].) Four concepts that have emerged from this 
literature show why the early years are so important, and the nature of the inefficiency we are 
pointing to. First, the architecture of the brain and the process of skill formation are influenced 
by an interaction between genetics and individual experience. The modern literature on 
epigenetic expression teaches us that the sharp distinction between acquired skills and ability 
featured in the early human capital literature is not tenable.  Both abilities and skills are produced 
and environments play a key role in determining gene expression (Gluckman and Hanson [2005], 
Rutter [2006]). Second, the mastery of skills that are essential for economic success and the 
development of their underlying neural pathways follow hierarchical rules. Later attainments 
build on foundations that are laid down earlier. This stems from two characteristics of the nature 
of learning. Early learning confers value on acquired skills, which leads to self-reinforcing 
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motivation to learn more. Early mastery of a range of cognitive, social, and emotional 
competencies makes learning at later ages more efficient and therefore easier and more likely to 
continue. It is well documented that gaps between the advantaged and disadvantaged in the 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills of their children emerge early (by ages 4 to 6) before the 
children enter school, and persist throughout the lifetime (Carneiro and Heckman [2003], Cunha 
et al. [2006]).  Evidence from Mexico is consistent with evidence from the U.S.  Figure 15 shows 
that IQ test gaps between children of educated mothers and those without emerge early in life 
and are substantial.  These gaps persist over life.  Schools barely budge these gaps.  The gaps are 
not solely caused by genes but are also shaped by family environments, and can be remediated 
by early intervention (Cunha and Heckman [2009], Heckman et al. [2010b]). 
 
Figure 15. Average percentile rank on Raven test score by mother's education 
 
 
Source: Author's calculations using MXFLS rounds 2002 and 2005. Percentiles are constructed for each age based 
on raw scores.  Raven is a measure of IQ. 
Note: The circles represent three different cohorts of children with mothers with less than primary education 
observed in two points in time. In the first period (2002), they were aged 5 to 7 years old, and 8 to 10 in 2005.  The 
triangles three different cohorts of children with mothers with less than primary education observed during the same 
periods and with the same ages. 
 
 Third, cognitive, linguistic, social, and emotional competencies are interdependent.  All are 
shaped powerfully by the experiences of the developing child.  All contribute to success in 
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society at large. While the role of cognitive skills in determining socio-economic success has 
received a lot of attention, non-cognitive skills, such as self-control, perseverance, and 
motivation, have also proven to be powerful predictors of outcomes such as high school 
graduation rates, earnings, achievement test scores, divorce rates and crime (Heckman et al. 
[2006], Borghans et al. [2008], Heckman et al. [2010a]).  
 Finally, although adaptation continues throughout life, human abilities are formed in a 
predictable sequence of sensitive periods, during which the development of specific neural 
circuits and the behaviors they mediate are the most plastic and therefore optimally receptive to 
environmental influences. Sensitive periods have been established in the formation of cognitive 
skills, before age three, where interactions among nutrition, stimulation and the environment 
play crucial roles. For example, a study of institutionalized Romanian children that had received 
little or no stimulation, shows that their brain development was well below that of an average 
child by age three (Rutter and O'Connor [2004]). The earlier they were adopted out into healthier 
environments, the easier it was to achieve remediation in their development. Similar effects were 
found in a study of girls in orphanages in South Korea with different levels of malnutrition 
(Winick et al. [1975], Lien et al. [October, 1977]). Those adopted into a middle-income 
household, before age two, achieved higher levels of cognitive development compared to those 
adopted later. Timing in childhood investment matters.  
Because of the dynamics of skill formation, skill begets skill, and investments in the early 
years are more productive than those in later years, particularly investments in disadvantaged 
children.  Figure 16 summarizes the central message of a large literature on the optimal timing of 
investment.  There is no equity-efficiency tradeoff when investing early in the lives of 
disadvantaged children.  Early investments lay the foundation for later investments. Although 
remediation for early deficits can be achieved later, say by adolescent interventions, it is costlier 
(see Cunha and Heckman [2006]). Hence, placing too much investment in later ages is inefficient 
if one is trying to level the playing field for those placed in the most disadvantaged situations by 
the accident of birth.  Mexico under-invests in the preschool years compared to the later years.  
See Figure 17. Most investments from government interventions are concentrated in elementary 
and secondary education.  The life cycle pattern of investment actually made in Mexico is the 
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reverse of what is implied by Figure 16—that relatively more should be invested in the early 
years. 
In the case of Mexico, this issue is especially important since an increasing proportion of 
children are being born into poverty with unfavorable family environments.  See Figure 18.  
Current policies toward early childhood do not address these gaps and promote inequality in 
society for the next generation. 
 
22 
 
Figure 16. Rates of Return to Human Capital Investment 
 
 
Source: Heckman [2006] 
 
Figure 17. Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP, by level of 
education (2006)  
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Figure 18. Percentage of Children Living Under Poverty 
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B. Mexican Families are under Stress 
Family environments play a crucial role in promoting skill formation (Cunha and Heckman 
[2009]). Families determine the resources invested in their children and influence child 
development by determining the amount of parenting and stimulation they provide to their 
offspring.  
A primary disadvantage for child development is the lack of cognitive and non-cognitive 
stimulation given to young children.  It is not simply a lack of financial resources (Cunha and 
Heckman [2009]), although poverty may be a cause of the lack of parenting.  Family factors play 
a major role in shaping child outcomes (Cunha and Heckman [2007; 2008], Moon [2010]).  
Significant changes in the structure of Mexican families are producing more children 
born into adverse environments. Some of the adverse trends that have emerged in recent years 
are increases in the number of children born into poverty, more births that occur out of wedlock, 
an increase in teenage pregnancy, more children living with single female-headed households, 
and more children in households with a partner absent due to migration. All of these trends 
indicate a transformation of the family in Mexico, and its role in child development, that likely 
reduces the amount of financial resources available for children and the quality of parenting. 
These environments have been shown to negatively affect child outcomes (McLanahan [2004; 
2009], Cunha et al. [2006]), and that is why we focus on them.   
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An increasing proportion of children is being born out of wedlock in Mexico in recent 
years. (See Figures 19, 20 and 21.) The percentage of registered births from cohabiting couples 
has increased nearly twenty percentage points in the period between 1985 and 2007. 
Cohabitation does not necessarily create an adverse environment per se, but it is generally 
associated with less stable unions compared to legal marriages (García and Rojas [2001], Solís 
and Medina [1996]). Partnership instability influences child emotional development, and has 
been related to increased maternal stress and health problems, which usually lead to poor 
parenting behaviors (McLanahan [2009]).  Weaker families invest less in their children (Moon 
[2009]).  Cohabitation in Mexico is more common in rural areas among younger, uneducated 
couples (Quilodrán [2000]).  Some cohabitating couples transit to legal marriages, but the overall 
duration of the unions is shorter (García and Rojas [2002]). 
Figure 19. Registered Births in Mexico. Marital Status of Mothers 
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 Another relevant trend is the increase in the proportion of female-headed households9. (See 
Figure 20.) The percentage of this type of household increased from 14.6% in 1992 to nearly 25 
percent in 2008. Female-headed households are a heterogeneous group. It is important to 
differentiate those with young children and headed by single mothers.  The proportion of 
households headed by unmarried females is rising and, with it, the adversity of child 
environments (see Figure 21).  An increasing proportion of these households lives in poverty, 
although the majority does not (see Figure 22). 
                                                 
9 Here the definition of headship is self-declared, and it is not necessarily economic headship, that is, it does not 
necessarily identify the individual that provides the greater amount of economic resources to the household.  
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Figure 20. Percent of Households Headed by a Female  
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Figure 21. Percent of Households Headed by a Female Not Married 
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 According to Parker and Gómez de León [2000], female-headed households are mostly 
formed by older women.10  They have lower levels of education compared to those headed by 
males, and have higher labor force participation rates as compared to other women, but lower 
than those of male-headed households. However, female heads who participate in the labor 
market have, on average, more precarious employment (they are mainly self-employed), earn 
lower income, and work more hours (Parker and Gómez de León [2000], Cortés and Rubalcava 
                                                 
10 A large fraction, roughly 40 percent, are widows.  
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[1995]).11  
 
Figure 22. Percent of Households Headed by a Female Not Married (by Poverty Status) 
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The lack of an earning partner in female-headed families reduces family resources.  The 
reliance on non-labor income increases their vulnerability.  Therefore children in these families 
face hardships and are pressured to enter the labor force earlier. Working mothers have a reduced 
amount of time to spend with their children, unless they have access to networks or child care 
substitutes for their parenting. Female headship has been found to be associated with lower 
                                                 
11 Contrary to what often happens in more developed countries, female-headed households have higher income than 
those headed by males, particularly in rural areas, and have a lower probability of being poor holding everything 
else the same (Cortes [1997]). This well-documented fact has puzzled researchers, but recent evidence suggests that 
the main reason for this is that social and family networks play crucial roles in supporting these households.  Non-
labor income, in the form of transfers either from other households or abroad, constitute a significant portion of their 
income (Parker and Gómez de León [2000], Villarreal and Shin [2008]).  Villarreal and Shin [2008] point out that 
there is also a selection effect that explains their higher income.  Those women who are more likely to maintain a 
household through access to networks are the ones observed as household heads. Nearly fifty percent of single 
mothers in Mexico in 1997 lived in households where another member was the head, usually one of their parents. 
These women are younger and have lower levels of education compared to those that are heads (Pérez [2008]). 
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school attainment among boys aged 12-17.  There is no clear effect for girls (Parker and Gómez 
de León [2000], Giorguli Saucedo [2002]).  In this type of household, children of these ages, 
regardless of gender, have been found to be more likely to participate in the labor force (Parker 
and Gómez de León [2000], Giorguli Saucedo [2002]).  
There has also been a slight increase in the proportion of teenage births.  In 2003, 6.2 
percent of registered births were from women younger than 18.  The figure was 7.2 percent in 
2008.12 Although the increase is small, the trend is not favorable for the growth of labor force 
quality in the next generation.  Teenage motherhood has negative consequences for child 
development. Evidence from Mexico shows that the children of teenage mothers have greater 
levels of malnutrition, lower levels of psychosocial and language development, and more 
behavioral problems (Buvinic [2000]).  See the discussion in Cunha and Heckman [2009], 
Heckman [2008] and Moon [2009]. 
Figure 23. Average Annual Flows of Mexican Migrants to the US (Thousands) 
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Source: National Mexican Population Council. http://www.conapo.gob.mx 
 
Finally, as a result of a growing number of migrants within and outside the country, a 
different type of Mexican household is emerging, where a member of the couple (usually the 
male) is absent for long periods of time.  Migration to the U.S. has increased greatly (see Figure 
23).13  The poorest regions contribute the most migrants.  Migration increases the monetary 
                                                 
12 See INEGI natality statistics. 
13 Hernadez-Leon and Zúñiga [2006] 
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resources available to households and this is a force for increasing investment in children.  When 
heads migrate to the U.S., their families experience less infant mortality, a lower probability of 
malnutrition, and less poverty (McKenzie and Hildebrandt [2005], Mora Rivera [2007]). 
However, migration also reduces the time parents spend with their children.  The net effect of 
migration of the head to the U.S. on the educational attainment of the children left behind is not 
clearly established in the literature (Hanson and Woodruff [2003], McKenzie and Rapoport 
[2006], Meza González and Pederzini Villarreal [2009], Boucher et al. [2005]).  This is a topic 
that requires much further study. 
 Current spending on programs to help the poor in Mexico is mistargeted.  The main social 
program designed to aid children in poverty is Progresa/Oportunidades.  This program is 
designed to increase school attendance starting in the elementary years, and focuses on health 
and nutrition in the years before schooling.  The weak effects of the program that have been 
found for cognitive development likely arise because it starts too late.14 A good step forward in 
Mexican policy is that pre-school for 3 year olds was made mandatory starting in 2009, although 
much remains to be done to achieve universal coverage and to enhance quality. Mexico needs to 
understand the importance of the early years.  It needs to recognize the greater stress under 
which many Mexican families now operate.  It should invest in the family lives of its 
disadvantaged children.  Such investments will promote growth in labor force quality and will 
also reduce inequality in the next generation. 
 
                                                 
14 See Behrman et al. [2000], Gertler and Fernald [2004], Behrman et al. [2006], and Fernald et al. [2009]. 
29 
 
  
VI. The Informal Sector: Its Origins and Its Consequences 
Mexico has a large informal sector. It is widely held that the informal sector causes static and 
dynamic inefficiency (Levy [2008]). But the evidence in support of this claim is surprisingly 
weak.  The category “informality” masks a diversity of categories with different trends and 
different productivities. Informality is a world-wide phenomenon found in both rich and poor 
countries (Italy and Peru). Mexican policy makers should never lose sight of the central fact that 
everywhere around the world, informality is primarily caused by regulation and levels of 
taxation. 
In a recent paper, La Porta and Shleifer [2008] summarize three leading approaches to the 
study of informality in the literature. The first view, which they refer to as the “romantic” view, 
is associated with the research of de Soto [1989; 2000]. According to this view, “unofficial firms 
are potentially extremely productive, and are held back by government taxes and regulation, as 
well as by lack of secure property rights and access to finance”.15 This view is particularly 
optimistic about informality, and seems to suggest that reducing the burden of taxes and 
government regulation would lead informal firms to switch into formality and potentially 
increase the overall productivity of the economy.  
The second view is associated with the McKinsey Global Institute reports (summarized 
by Lewis [2004]). According to this view, informal firms are parasites stealing from fiscal 
authorities and underperforming. They are the persistently unproductive firms that drain fiscal 
resources and contribute to the low level of infrastructure. This view emphasizes that informal 
firms not only hurt the productive sector of the economy by stealing market share from the more 
productive firms, but they also reduce their own potential by remaining small in order to avoid 
detection. Under this view, informal firms are reducing the overall performance of the economy.  
Increasing enforcement to eradicate informal firms would improve the efficiency of the 
economy.  
The third view, which La Porta and Shleifer [2008] refer to as the “dual” view, is 
associated with the early work of Harris and Todaro [1970] and Rauch [1991].  It emphasizes the 
inefficiencies of informal firms, which cannot survive except when they are indirectly subsidized 
                                                 
15 La Porta and Shleifer [2008] 
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by avoiding the taxes and regulations of governments.  In this view, increasing the productivity 
of the overall economy will drive these intrinsically unproductive firms out of business. They 
cannot compete with formal firms and, as economic development progresses, they will 
disappear. The policy implications of each polar view are quite different. Under the “romantic 
view,” the appropriate policy would be to reduce the burden of regulation and, as a consequence, 
the economy should increase its efficiency and overall productivity. The McKinsey view 
suggests that the appropriate policy is to tax the informal sector and bring it into the fiscal sector 
by increasing the enforcement and compliance with regulations and taxes. The “dual” view 
suggests that economic development will inevitably cause the informal firms to go out of 
business.  
All of these interpretations of informality are consistent with the evidence that informal 
firms are smaller and less productive than formal ones (Maloney [2009], La Porta and Shleifer 
[2008], Levy [2008]). Moreover, the “dual” view can be expressed as an equilibrium result in a 
self-selection model that embraces the “romantic” and “McKinsey views”. Savard et al. [1997], 
de Paula and Scheinkman [2008] and Amaral and Quintin [2006] provide three complementary 
models that lead to equilibrium outcomes characterized by a substantial presence of informal 
firms that could not survive in the formal sector and that are smaller and less productive than 
formal firms.  
These models share similar features about the way they model how firms decide to 
become formal.  Firms sort into the formal sector based on an underlying distribution of 
managerial talent. A trade-off is evident as informal firms are able to avoid paying taxes but face 
an increasing cost of evasion. For instance, in the model of De Paula and Sheinkman (DPS), 
formal firms have to pay taxes but face a lower price of capital.  Informal firms pay a higher 
price of capital and incur costs of evasion that increase with the size of the firm. These models 
share the economic intuition that in equilibrium, firms self-select into the formal sector based on 
the underlying distribution of managerial talent. Here we sketch a simplified version of a 
prototypical model of self-selection to clarify the discussion of informality.  
It is important to note that self-selection in static models implies that the observed 
differences in productivity between formal and informal firms are the result of a selection 
process, leaving no place for a causal impact of the formal status on productivity or firms’ 
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performance.16  Informality is a consequence of regulations that reduce the profitability of being 
formal, not primarily a direct cause of lower productivity. 
A. A Model of Self-Selection Without Investment 
We present a simplified version of the model in Savard et al. [1997] and de Paula and 
Scheinkman [2008].  We seek to capture the nature of self-selection in the firm’s decision to join 
the informal sector. Consider an economy where firms have to decide whether to join the formal 
sector or not.  Let   be firm productivity. There is an underlying distribution of firm 
productivity, ( )  , and firms face a trade-off because joining the formal sector allows them to 
sell their product at a higher price, but they would have to pay labor taxes in addition to a higher 
fixed cost relative to firms in the informal sector. All firms share the same production function, 
( , )  f L L . Output prices vary with firms’ status, f IP P , where fP  and IP  denote formal and 
informal prices, respectively. Thus, gross earnings are iP L , for i {formal, informal}. Formal 
firms pay labor taxes.  The cost functions are (1 )  f fC wL c  and  i IC wL c  for formal and 
informal firms, respectively, where fc  and Ic  are fixed costs of doing business in each sector.
17  
Here the main assumption is that informal firms avoid paying labor taxes and face a lower fixed 
cost, but they must sell their product at a lower price. The firm problem is 
   
formal/informal
1 ; .max max max       f f I I
L L
P L w L c P L wL c  
It is straightforward to show that the solution to this problem implies that there is a 
threshold level of productivity ˆ  such that for firms with high enough productivity, so ˆ  , the 
firm chooses to be formal and for ˆ   the firm chooses to be informal.18  Graphically, the 
                                                 
16 This result contrasts with the conclusion of Perry et al. [2007]. Those authors study a sample of approximately 
5,000 micro-firms and attempt to identify the effect of formality and participation in other societal institutions on 
firms’ performance. They claim to find a positive causal effect of formality (defined as paying at least some taxes, 
30% of the firms in their sample). However, it is unclear that their matching estimator actually corrects the selection 
bias because they have a limited set of variables to match on. Another limitation of their study is that that the vast 
majority of the firms in their sample are self-employed workers (i.e. two thirds of the sample). 
17 For simplicity, we assume a fixed cost associated with the firms’ status, but the model can easily be extended to 
incorporate a cost that is increasing in the firms’ size, capturing the increasing probability of being caught by 
government officials. 
18 We can solve for the equilibrium threshold of productivity: 
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solution of this model implies a cutoff above which firms become formal.  Figure 24 plots the 
profit functions for the same firm operating in the formal and informal sectors ( f  and  I  
respectively) as a function of firm productivity.  
 
Figure 24. Equilibrium Level of Profits in the Formal and Informal Sectors 
 
 
Our view of informality as an outcome of a self-selection process is consistent with all 
three views of informality summarized in La Porta and Shleifer [2008].  Here, formal firms are 
more productive through a selection process, and not because informality reduces productivity.  
Informal firms evade taxes and lower the fiscal base contributing to weak public infrastructure. 
But notice that contrary to claims by Maloney [2009] and Perry et al. [2007], informality does 
                                                                                                                                                             
(footnote 19 continued) 
1
ˆ
1 11111 1 1
1
c cIf
Pf P PIfw

      



   
                               
. 
 
33 
 
not cause less productivity.  Lower productivity firms select into informality. The cause of the 
selection is the burden of regulation and the greater cost of doing business.  
As long as the distribution of talent (or firms’ productivity) determines the firms’ status 
and the self-selection criteria, claims about static inefficiencies of informality remain ambiguous. 
In fact, one can argue that the existence of informal firms, or the informal sectors of formal firms 
that evade labor regulation, serves a productive role in allowing firms to hire informal workers in 
response to transitory shocks in demand.  In this case, firms would avoid severance costs and 
other costs of adjustment that are large, partly due to excessive regulation. Moreover, informal 
firms employ and generate revenues for millions of people who otherwise would not be able to 
compete in an environment characterized by a high cost of doing business and regulation.  
Removing its burden of regulation and taxation, the Mexican economy would attract 
more firms into formality and raise the public resources to invest in its infrastructure. Raising 
enforcement and revenue collection on informal firms would operate to drive firms out of the 
informal sector altogether, with potential negative impacts on unemployment and increases in 
poverty levels.  
The importance of regulation in causing informality cannot be overemphasized.  
Evidence from Brazil’s increase in the cost of labor regulation is informative. The constitutional 
reform in Brazil implemented in 1988 made it much harder to fire workers. Ulyssea [2010] 
reports a dramatic increase in the share of labor in the informal sector as a consequence of the 
increase in regulation. See Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Informal Sector Evolution in Brazil. Source: Monthly Survey (PME). Second y-
axis: Informal Salaried Employees as a Share of Total Informal Employment (in %) 
 
 
Source: Ulyssea [2010] 
 
B. Dynamic Inefficiencies 
The previous analysis is based on a static model of informality.  In that model, regulation selects 
less productive firms into the informal sector.  However, the dynamic implications of informality 
are likely to be very important.  Informality can cause low productivity by affecting investment.  
Restricted access to capital markets in the informal sector likely reduces both physical capital 
and human capital accumulation, although much more empirical research remains to be done to 
solidify this conclusion.  Returns to work experience are lower in the informal sector, suggesting 
that human capital accumulation is impaired by informality.  (See Figure 26.) 
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Figure 26. Mean returns to experience of salaried workers by formality status 
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C. Informality in Mexico 
Mexican law is not clear on what arrangements should be considered informal.  The definitions 
based on the Mexican Federal Labor Law and the Mexican Law of Social Security are in 
conflict. The former makes no distinctions among economic activities. Thus, it includes workers 
in all sectors of the economy, including agriculture. The latter has a special category for 
agricultural workers. Given these conflicting definitions, any analysis of informality in Mexico 
should include a discussion of the potential conflict in measurements of informality created by 
the conflicting provisions of these laws. This discussion is particularly relevant for understanding 
possible effects of social protection programs in the country which operate in rural and semi-
urban settings. 19 
Workers and firms in each economic sector face the dichotomy created by the legal 
framework. Moreover, workers in the agricultural sector are more likely to place higher 
valuation of the benefits of social protection programs. The reason for this is quite simple: rural 
villages and municipalities have limited or no access to the bundle of services provided by the 
formal social security institutions.  
Our definitions of informality follow an approach similar to that used by Levy [2008].  
He includes agricultural workers in his estimate of illegal poor workers.20 Figure 27 shows 
informal employment decomposed by agriculture and non-agriculture sectors. This graph clearly 
shows an increase of informality in non-agricultural occupations and a decrease in informality in 
the agriculture sector. Taking these trends into account, the overall percent of workers not 
covered by social security has decreased slightly over the period.21  
                                                 
19 We define informality to include the following mutually exclusive categories: 
1. Illegal salaried worker: Workers that have a boss and receive a fixed salary on a regular basis and are not 
covered by any of the social security institutes (IMSS, ISSSTE, PEMEX, and others). 
2. Comisionistas: Workers that have a boss but do not receive a salary, they might get paid in tips, per work 
fees, etc. They are NOT required by law to have social security. 
3. Unpaid workers: Those who do not receive monetary payment for their work. 
4. Self-employed: Workers with no boss, and work on their own basis. 
5. Unclassified Informal: They are employers in firms that are household based. Firms are classified as 
household based if they do not have a separate accounting for their business. This category also includes a 
very small number of workers that were not classified in the previous categories, but are included in the 
informal sector definition of INEGI. 
20 See his Appendix 4. 
21 All our analysis is based on the official labor surveys of INEGI. For the period 1995-2004 we used the Encuesta 
Nacional de Empleo (ENE) homologated to the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo (ENOE), and for the 
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Figure 27. Informal Employment by relation to Agricultural Sector 
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Source: authors’ estimation using ENE and ENOE 1995-2009. We used the homologated data publicly available by INEGI 
Specifically, the percentage of workers not covered by social security (agriculture and 
non-agriculture) decreased from 66 to 62 percent between 1995 and 2009.  The agricultural 
workers not covered by social security decreased from 21 to 11 percent, while non-agricultural 
informality increased from 44 to 50%. The downward trend in agricultural employment and the 
upward trend in non-agricultural employment are explained by the process of urbanization.  The 
total reduction of agricultural employment was not fully translated into the urban informal labor 
force.  Only half of the population who migrated to urban areas joined the informal economy. In 
other words, urban areas absorbed the migrant population from the rural areas, both in the formal 
and informal economy.   
Our understanding of informality becomes clearer if we decompose the total 
economically active population by sector. This allows us to determine how the composition of 
employment, both formal and informal, is shifting across sectors.  Figure 28 describes the 
changes in the labor force with respect to the economic sector of employment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
period 2005-2009 we used the ENOE. We used only the second quarter of every year.  Informality is determined by 
the status of the interviewee in the week prior to the survey. 
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Figure 28. Population Economically Active by Sector of the Economy 
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Source: authors’ estimation using ENE and ENOE 1995-2009. We used the homologated data publicly available by INEGI 
The composition of the Mexican labor force is changing. The labor force is growing in 
the service and commerce sectors, while the trend is against manufactures and agriculture over 
the current decade. The transformation of the labor force has an effect on the composition of 
formal and informal urban labor markets.  Growing urbanization is reshaping the composition of 
the labor markets and is a main cause of the increase in informality.  
To get a sense of the elasticity of worker’s preferences for social security, we decompose 
informality into different occupational categories.  We study the growth of informality including 
(Figure 29) and excluding (Figure 30) the agricultural sector. 
Figure 29. Composition of Informal Labor Force (1995-2009) 
(% of Informal Employment) 
 
Source: authors’ estimation using ENE and ENOE 1995-2009. We used the homologated data publicly available by INEGI 
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Figure 30. Composition of Non-Agricultural Informal Labor Force (1995-2009) 
(% of Non-Agricultural Informal Employment) 
 
Source: authors’ estimation using ENE and ENOE 1995-2009. We used the homologated data publicly available by INEGI 
These figures reveal that only the share of the category “illegal salaried workers” has 
increased over time. This category includes workers who have a boss, receive a salary on a 
regular basis and are not covered by any of the social security formal institutions (IMSS, 
ISSSTE, PEMEX). The proportion of self-employed and unclassified informal workers remained 
stable over the period, while the proportion of comisionistas and unpaid workers decreased over 
the period.  We also analyze the agricultural sector using the same definitions of informal 
occupations. The trends are quite similar: the category of illegal salaried workers is the only 
category that increased during the period of analysis, while self-employed, comisionistas and 
formal salaried remain constant. Only unpaid workers reduced their participation.  
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Figure 31. Agricultural employment by type of job 
 
Source: authors’ estimation using ENE and ENOE 1995-2009. We used the data publicly available by INEGI 
Our analysis of formality and informality is summarized in Figure 32. We observe an 
increase in the percentage of workers in the formal sector and the illegal salaried workers.  The 
percentage of workers in the formal sector went up from 30 to 35 while the share of illegal 
salaried workers increased from 20 to 26 percent.  Unpaid workers decreased from 12 to 6 
percent, while the remaining categories (self-employed, comisionistas and unclassified informal 
workers) have maintained their participation in the labor force stable.  
Figure 32. Total Employment by type of Occupation 
 
 
Source: authors’ estimation using ENE and ENOE 1995-2009. We used the homologated data publicly available by INEGI 
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D. Seguro Popular and the Growth of Informality  
In 2002, the Mexican federal government introduced Seguro Popular, an ambitious social 
program whose objective is to provide those individuals (and their families) not covered by 
social security with a basic health insurance package.  Individuals in the formal sector have these 
benefits.  In the informal sector they do not.  The Seguro package includes 266 medical 
interventions, which go from routine check-ups to third level surgeries, and the program is 
scheduled to cover all uninsured, which in Mexico represent roughly half of the population, by 
2013.  The percentage of families covered by Seguro Popular is large (Figure 33), varies by 
region, and has been increasing (Figure 34). 
 
Figure 33. Seguro Popular. Percentage of Families Covered by State in 2009 
 
Concerns have been expressed that the way Seguro Popular targets informal workers creates 
perverse incentives that encourage a decrease in labor supply, or a shift towards working in 
informal activities, hindering economic growth (Levy [2008]). 
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Figure 34. Seguro Popular. Total Households Covered by Year (Millions) 
 
 
Affiliation with Seguro Popular is reserved for people who are not beneficiaries of 
Mexico’s social security institutions, either because they are informal workers or because they do 
not work.  Annual fees depend on declared income, but individuals in the lowest two deciles of 
the income distribution do not have to pay them, and declared income is seldom verified by 
program administrators. In monetary terms, the benefits provided by the program represent a 
nontrivial share of the average annual earnings of a salaried worker.  See Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35. Seguro Popular. Share of salaried workers’ Annual Earnings 
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We seek to investigate the effects of expansion of social protection programs such as 
Seguro Popular as determinants of the trends in informality. A relevant aspect of this analysis is 
that workers’ decisions to participate in the formal sector are based in part on their valuation of 
social security benefits. Levy [2008] analyzes the effect of social protection programs and social 
security on the composition of the labor force. According to his argument, those workers who 
prefer social protection programs are more likely to be employed in any of the following 
categories of informality: self-employed, unpaid, “comisionistas”, or illegal salaried. The 
reasoning is that the only requirement for receiving social protection is exclusion from social 
security, so workers would prefer to have an occupation with a higher wage paid in cash with no 
social security benefits than a lower wage with contributions to social security.   
In our analysis, we explore whether Seguro Popular has had an effect on the level of 
illegal salaried employment. This category should be covered by social security according to the 
Federal Law of Labor and the Law of Social Security (there is no legal contradiction for its 
coverage) and it is the only component that increased over the period. 
Figure 36. Trends in illegal salaried employment, external sector and Seguro Popular  
 
Source: authors’ estimation using ENE and ENOE 1995-2009. We used the homologated data publicly available by INEGI 
As can be seen from Figure 36, the percentage of illegal salaried workers follows an 
upward trend even in the years prior to the beginning of Seguro Popular and there is little 
evidence that Seguro Popular budged the trend line. Furthermore, when comparing other 
economic indicators before and after the inclusion of the program, the economy experienced 
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changes that could also explain the increase in illegal salaried workers. In particular, the growth 
in exports outside of the oil sector was negative. Since non-oil exports have a direct effect on the 
employment in the manufacturing sector, the reduction would suggest that the rigidities of key 
sectors discussed in the first part of the paper have a substantial impact on the trend of 
informality. The explanation of this would be the lower attractiveness of doing business in 
Mexico compared with other emerging economies.   
Recent research questions the claim that Seguro Popular fostered informality.  Barros 
[2009] uses individual data from the National Survey of Households’ Income and Expenditure 
(Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares) (ENIGH). He finds no effect of the 
program on labor force participation nor on the hours worked of beneficiaries.  According to his 
results, Seguro Popular does not shift formal workers to the informal sector.  Knox [2008] uses 
individual data from the Evaluation Survey of Urban Households (Encuesta de Evaluación de los 
Hogares Urbanos) (ENCELURB) and municipio-level data from the National Employment 
Survey (EncuestaNacional de Empleo) (ENE). He finds no statistically significant effect of the 
program on formal employment rates.  Knox [2008] uses individual data from ENCELURB, and 
finds no effects on labor force participation, hours worked nor weeks worked of all heads of 
household. 
If the program has shifted a relevant number of workers from formal to informal 
activities, we should observe a fall in formal employment with a corresponding increase in the 
wages of formal workers, as well as an increase in informal employment, accompanied by a fall 
in informal workers’ wages. However, as previously established, employment in both formal and 
informal activities has risen and, as Figure 37 shows, real wages for both types of workers have 
increased. 
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Figure 37. Salaried Workers’ Hourly Wages 
 
Although the benefits from the program in monetary terms are apparently large, they 
might not significantly affect working decisions. Although Seguro Popular covers a wide array 
of medical interventions, a worker who moved from formal to informal activities would forego 
not only medical benefits, but also access to housing loans, a pension, disability insurance and 
other benefits. Moreover, as is well-documented in the literature and evident in Figure 37, 
average wages are higher for formal workers (Moreno [2007], Esquivel and Ordaz-Diaz [2008]).  
A model with free mobility of labor between activities, driven by an implicit assumption 
of homogeneous agents, would predict a large shift of workers from formal to informal activities 
as a result of an increase in the benefits of performing the latter.  There is little evidence of such 
a shift. 
Recent empirical studies show high and symmetric mobility of individuals between 
informal and formal activities, with higher mobility between formal and informal activities 
among low-wage earners than among high-wage earners, and with higher search for jobs in and 
entry into informality during upturns than downturns.  These studies have been interpreted as 
evidence of close integration of formal and informal markets (Levy [2008], Maloney [1999], 
Maloney [2009]) and have been used to justify assumptions of homogeneity and free mobility.  
In fact, this evidence is consistent with segmentation.  
First, as noted by Dickens and Lang [1992], lack of mobility should not be confounded 
with barriers to entry, because in the extreme no mobility between sectors could be consistent 
with complete barriers to entry or no barriers at all. For example, if workers always enter their 
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preferred sector on their first job, we would not observe mobility between sectors even in the 
absence of barriers.  Second, if highly productive individuals can perform whatever activity they 
prefer, but less productive workers must queue for formal jobs, then less productive workers will 
be more likely to move into formality.  
Finally and more importantly, the idea that in a segmented labor market flows from 
formality into informality should only occur during bad economic times, as individuals “seek 
some form of income to stay afloat” (Maloney [2009]), comes from a traditional view of labor 
market segmentation as a situation where some individuals who would otherwise optimally 
choose to be formal workers, are prevented from doing so by institutional barriers to 
occupational mobility and, therefore, must queue for formal jobs and work in informal activities 
only to subsist while they obtain one. Related to this view is the incorrect notion that, in a 
competitive market, all workers should be indifferent between working in formal or informal 
activities in equilibrium.  
As Magnac [1991] points out, even if the market is competitive as a whole, comparative 
advantages remain for almost all workers, and thus it is important to distinguish between 
marginal and average agents. Segmentation does not necessarily imply that those individuals 
who are observed performing informal activities are forced to do so.  Rationing can simply mean 
that, on top of the foregone earnings, there is a direct cost of entry into formality, which will be 
paid for by those who find it in their best interest to do so. Whether there is free entry into the 
regulated sector or not, comparative advantages exist and dictate choices. Flows from formality 
into informality might occur during upturns even in the presence of segmentation. 
Accounting for comparative advantage in the labor market makes it less likely that 
Seguro Popular massively shifted individuals from formality into informality in comparison with 
a model with homogeneous skills.  If comparative advantage dictates choice, as one would 
expect, because of heterogeneity among individuals, then labor supply between sectors is not 
completely elastic, whether or not there are or not barriers to entry, and workers will not 
necessarily change status in response to movements in relative benefits (Marrufo [2001]), 
particularly if the change in the latter were perceived to be small.  Using data from the Social 
Security Reform of 1997, Marrufo [2001] estimates a pass-through in the covered sector of taxes 
to wages of 43% of the tax change, holding benefits constant, and a pass-through of benefits to 
wages of 57% of the value of the former, assuming taxes are unchanged and benefits are fully 
47 
 
valued by workers. These estimates imply that labor supply is neither completely inelastic nor 
completely elastic, a view consistent with the notion that Seguro Popular has not significantly 
altered decisions regarding workers’ formal status.  
Knox [2008] shows that there is no statistically significant link between the 
implementation of Seguro Popular, and a change in informal employment.  Azuara and 
Marinescu [2010] report similar results from a study of the effect of SP on informality by region 
that exploits the differences in the introduction of SP across regions.  More work remains to be 
done regarding the impact of social programs on labor outcomes. Given the large expenditure of 
public resources on social protection programs—around 2 percent of the GDP in 2008—and the 
targeted nature of the social protection programs, it is unlikely that they have had no effect on 
individual working decisions.  At issue is the economic importance of this effect.  Future 
research would benefit from explicitly considering and modeling how the incentives of different 
types of workers, both within the formal and informal statuses, are affected by the changes in 
relative benefits introduced by social programs.  But the available evidence suggests that 
regulation and not social programs are the principal cause of informality in the Mexican 
economy. 
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VII. Summary 
The Mexican economy has performed poorly over the last 30 years.  Monopoly, regulation, 
taxation and the poor quality of infrastructure and public services explain much of this poor 
performance.  These issues are much discussed but little acted on in Mexican public policy. 
We have discussed two additional topics not usually mentioned in discussions of 
Mexican productivity and economic growth that deserve much greater attention.  First, we show 
that there is an increasing proportion of children living in disadvantaged environments due to 
changing family structures.  Such arrangements lead to less investment in children. This 
phenomenon will have major implications for child development and the productivity of the 
work force of the next generation.  Progresa/Oportunidades operates too late in the life cycles of 
disadvantaged children to be effective.  Mexican policy should better target the early preschool 
years of disadvantaged children. 
Second, we have addressed the problem of informality in the Mexican economy.  The 
major cause of informality is regulation and taxation.  Regulation causes less productive firms to 
participate in the informal sector to avoid costs.  This has dynamic effects on investment in 
physical and human capital, and reduces productivity growth in Mexico.  There is little evidence 
that the introduction of social programs targeted towards informal workers has played a major 
role in promoting informality. 
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